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Abstract
It is an axiom of contemporary conversations about austerity and health care that the 
relationship between the two is essentially direct. Cutting funds damages health care 
systems and hurts the health of individuals who rely on them. Though this premise 
has provoked necessary discussion about global politics, the global economy and 
their impact on individual well-being, it is nonetheless intrinsically problematic. 
Assigning health and health care as objects of austerity not only obscures the com-
plexity of health care systems and the opacity of health’s definitional borders, but 
also misunderstands austerity, its manifestations and its significance. The ambition 
of this essay is to bring health care back into the debate, in order to establish the 
greater dynamism of the contemporary austerity and health care relationship. This 
historical reconstruction will challenge the significance of our current situating of 
austerity as health care’s bogeyman, press for a reconsideration of our contemporary 
definitions of the key factors involved here (health, health care and austerity) and 
finally conclude with some thoughts on how we might more productively approach 
the problem of health now.
Keywords Austerity · History · Health care · Health
It is not especially controversial to suggest in a publication like this that austerity 
has been a failure [1, 2, 5, 22, 23, 28, 32, 34–37, 40, 43]. Many commentators have 
given evidence that belt-tightening measures imposed after the global financial cri-
sis of 2008 have not righted the economic ship, and that a decade of cuts to wel-
fare spending has had a grossly detrimental impact on health and wellbeing [1, 34, 
36]. Defunding state services upon which health depends—including sanitation and 
infrastructural safety—did, does, and will likely always have a detrimental effect on 
the health of the public [1, 5, 22, 23, 28, 32, 34, 36, 40, 43].
There is no need to belabour these points. Instead, this article will examine a more 
ineffable, but no less important way in which austerity relates to health, namely as 
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a rhetorical smokescreen obscuring problems intrinsic to the health care system we 
have inherited. Rather than acknowledging that some of the problems highlighted in 
the name of austerity are historically specific responses to a longer story about the 
history of health and health care as these have developed over the last several cen-
turies, we often treat health care as a morally benevolent system that, where it fails, 
fails as a result of external factors that act upon it. While it is in one sense no doubt 
true that, as one commentator articulated, ill health is the embodiment of austerity, 
in another sense, the more important point is that ill health is just as much, if not 
more so, the embodiment—the creation, in fact—of medicine itself [36].
This is the relationship that we will explore and flesh out a bit here, along two 
lines of enquiry. We will first trace the earlier history of modern medicine, examin-
ing the ways in which the system of medical care that we know today was built, and 
demonstrating how ill health as an object of health care was constructed over this 
period—not as a result of any kind of particular imperative on the part of medi-
cine to care, but instead, as the locus in which newly defined categories of disease 
could be placed. This was a system that worked, in some senses, not in spite of, but 
because of its ability not to care about individuals in the particular [14]. This done, 
we will move forward to a later point in this history, observing the ways in which 
the expectations for health care shifted in the late 20th century, when our current 
mismatch, between the ‘care’ that we demand from medicine and its longer-standing 
epistemological imperative not to care in order to cure, came to be.
It is important to note at the outset that this article is not intended as a critique of 
the logic of past or current medical practice. Nor is it meant to reflect on the valid-
ity of the efforts of those within medical spheres to address the imbalances between 
expectations for health care and its systemic possibilities touched upon here. This 
work similarly does not take a stand about what medicine ought to look like or about 
whether the current focus on ‘caring’ is better than the focus that preceded it. Its 
aspirations are in fact much simpler, seeking only to situate these questions in a 
longer, contingent history of medicine in order to demonstrate the ways in which 
the rhetoric of austerity we deploy today often works against a more complex under-
standing of medicine and its epistemological underpinnings. If this story does have 
a moral, it is this: we can and should distinguish between the many forces, external 
and internal, that impact health care as we know it. Indeed, we must do this if we 
want to understand the roots of our dissatisfaction with health care and then map and 
create the reforms that we would like to see.
Building Health Care
It would be impossible to pinpoint a single point of origin for our current iterations 
of health and health care, though, for the sake of convention, historians have gen-
erally considered their emergence as a 19th century phenomenon. In the opening 
decades of the 1800s, long before the germ theory of disease had fully taken hold, 
a new form of medical thinking had already started to gain sway. It marked a pro-
nounced shift in medicine, from an embrace of healing practices and treatments 
which had been aimed to address the specific circumstances of a patient—whether 
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constitutional, environmental or circumstantial—and toward the establishment of 
disease as an abstracted, intellectual entity. It’s hard to overemphasise how funda-
mental this shift in attention from the particular to the general, and from the indi-
vidual to the disease, actually was. The eminent historian of medicine Charles 
Rosenberg has likened it in significance to the revolutions in thought led by Darwin, 
Newton and Freud, with one key difference: these thinkers and their work have been 
given place in history as heralds of a sea change, while medicine’s transformation is 
still largely unrecognised [33].
As one might well imagine, in the midst of this slow re-orientation, many nine-
teenth century health practitioners were sceptical that this abstracted approach to 
health represented a legitimate therapeutic way forward. As the physician John Rob-
ertson wrote in 1827, “The degree to which diseases are modified by constitution, 
season, climate and an infinite variety of accidental circumstances renders at least 
doubtful the notion that formal categories of disease could be transformative for 
medicine” [33]. To others like him, this new idea was on its face nonsensical. How 
could an individual body, comprised of the unique tendencies that made it individual 
in the first place, be accounted for by a system that required, in order to work, the 
interchangeability of symptoms and disease presentations across whole populations? 
Disease categories might be useful, they opined, but likely only as part of a larger 
medical armamentarium.
Despite its detractors, however, this new methodology was moving ahead, buoyed 
by the larger movement toward statistical thinking more generally. As the statistician 
William Farr put it in 1842,
The advantages of a uniform statistical nomenclature, however imperfect, are 
so obvious, that it is surprising no attention has been paid to its enforcement…
Each disease has, in many instances, been denoted by three or four terms, and 
each term has been applied to as many different diseases: vague, inconvenient 
names have been employed, or complications have been registered instead of 
primary diseases. The nomenclature is of as much importance in this depart-
ment of inquiry as weights and measures in the physical sciences, and should 
be settled without delay [8].
This tendency toward standardisation and classification took even firmer root within 
the practice of medicine itself in the early twentieth century, when various enti-
ties within and outside medicine pushed for the standardisation of medical spaces, 
medical diagnosis and treatment, medical education and the establishment of a new 
knowledge-based criteria by which individuals could be admitted into, or kept out 
of, the profession.
We have tended to regard these organisational improvements as unproblematic 
and, indeed, necessary steps toward the improvement of health care altogether, both 
now and in the heyday of these standardising efforts. And it is true that these are the 
epistemological roots of our current health care system—standardisation as a prac-
tice and mode of medical inquiry was at least as important as the new experimental 
findings coming out of laboratories in this period [12, 38]. The changes that stand-
ardisation wrought, however, came not through cooperation but most often through 
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politics, with the triumph of points of view that often won out regardless of whether 
or not they reflected something we might call best practices [3, 29, 41].
In the well-known case of medical education’s early 20th century standardisa-
tion in the United States, it was the pedagogies of a set of elite medical universities 
that won the standardisation battle [10]. It is certainly true that the medical curricu-
lar guidelines they drew up and enforced generally improved the state of medical 
education; however, it is less clear that these represented the best possible or most 
appropriate among those circulating at the time. Instructive in this vein are the early-
century denunciations of individuals like the American standardising zealot Ernest 
Amory Codman, who glimpsed professional self-promotion (rather than best or even 
generalisable principles) as the primary driver of his colleagues’ endeavours to set 
certain knowledge claims as standard [6, 13, 31]. Whether or not Codman’s sense of 
his colleagues’ motivations was accurate, he was certainly right in his recognition 
that the process by which standards were made was deeply subjective. A relatively 
small number of practitioners were in the unique position to decide what was ‘best’ 
and would become standard whether or not it suited the incredibly diverse medical 
landscape of the early 20th century United States [3, 41].
Following the history by which medical practice became standardised reveals 
the enormous significance medical standardisation had in its own right, as a pro-
cess that rendered health legible. When everybody did the same thing, whether or 
not it was the best thing, it was much easier to police results, much easier to evalu-
ate diagnostic and therapeutic practices, much easier to aggregate and communicate 
findings, much easier, indeed, to ‘improve’ the system. We have had a tendency to 
put the emphasis only on one part of medicine’s knowledge production system—the 
purported quality of the data—when considering it historically. But it is retrospec-
tively clear that it is the process of standardisation, and not just the material that was 
standardised, that deserves credit for medicine’s resulting sea change. But while the 
standardisation of medicine itself was in many ways a great therapeutic and diagnos-
tic boon, it also systemically undid any remaining sense that the particularities of the 
patient ought to be considered over and above diagnostic categories.
The ‘Care’ of Health Care
Part of the reason this new iteration of medicine ‘worked’ was because it matched 
growing sentiment about how knowledge of the public, its individual constitu-
ents and the world in which they lived should be described and reproduced in 
everyday life [18, 29]. Modern medicine was coming to be in an age with a more 
general rising intellectual preference for a brand of knowledge that routinely dis-
placed particular, material experiences in favour of universal conceptual struc-
tures, and the resulting system of health care created in great part by the success 
of standardising efforts proved impressively powerful. Its promotion of diagnostic 
categories over and above illness particularities not only shaped medical action 
in the early twentieth century, but also health care’s trajectory and methodolo-
gies going forward, casting aside challengers that abstained from its population-
centric, statistical approach and creating a wide category of abnormality for ill 
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bodies that did not conduct themselves in ways that were symptomatically con-
sistent and categorically legible.
To be sure, some critics continued to echo Robertson throughout the early 
decades of the twentieth century, but the question of whether health care should 
‘care’ was only really raised explicitly again in the aftermath of World War II 
when medical communities in both Britain and the United States were con-
fronted with the possibility of a nationalized medical service. In both countries, 
the aversion of the medical community to health care’s nationalisation was deep 
and intense. In the United States, the powerful American Medical Association 
(AMA) expressed one strand of the medical distaste for nationalised care: the loss 
of professional autonomy it potentially carried with it. To forestall this, the AMA 
undertook a successful propaganda campaign, a chief part of which rested on the 
circulation of the message that the intervention of the state would displace the 
caring, attentive doctor with one that was bureaucratic, cold, and impersonal. To 
this end, the AMA’s public relations team put to especially good use a Victorian 
painting by Luke Fildes, entitled ‘The Doctor’ (1887), which depicted a besuited 
doctor in a young patient’s modest home, keeping constant vigil, brow furrowed 
in concern, while the child’s anguished parents looked on. Emblazoned with the 
tagline: ‘Keep Politics out of this Picture,’ the image helped to create an image of 
medicine not only as caring and personal but also as historically and vocationally 
so [42].
Though the AMA did not, of course, invent the notion that medicine should care, 
it did popularise and spread a very particular kind of claim about what that caring 
looked like. And this notion of caring was, from the start, oddly conflicted. Even as 
they held up a painting that idealised the physician’s dedication to his patients and 
his investment in their health as their banner, the profession was promoting itself 
through a narrative of technological and institutional accomplishments [17]. Indeed, 
when read within the contemporary medical milieu, the Fildesian portrait of caring 
medicine seems more likely to invite the observation that this doctor might have had 
to care because he could not cure. But in fact, even in its own time, ‘The Doctor’ 
was not reflective of the state of medicine. Instead, Fildes was doing the same kind 
of propaganda work with his painting that the AMA would later use it to do: to show 
the doctor, as one physician put it in 1892, not necessarily as he is, but “as we would 
like [him] to be shown” [27]. The AMA was using for its marketing a painting that 
had been used for much the same purpose in the Victorian Era. This was nostalgia 
built on a nostalgia, with no true moment of caring as antecedent.
The wave of medical criticism toward the end of the 20th century did not let the 
conflicted nature of this ‘caring’ motif pass by unnoticed. Following the broader 
critiques of cultural structures at mid-century, a collection of critics began to view 
growing health care systems as fundamentally unconcerned with both caring and 
curing. The bureaucratic structures of government that the AMA harped on as 
threatening medicine were, in fact, the same structures that the medical establish-
ment had adopted for itself. And the purpose of these structures, as some critics put 
it, was not to improve human health; instead, it was to amplify medicine’s authority 
to adjudicate ever enlarging circles of human activity, such that increasing swathes 
of life were claimed for medicine [11]. This was, in many ways, the rightful—if a 
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bit baleful—function of a modern system built in the first place on the imperative to 
standardise.
From about 1950–1970, the British physician and demographer Thomas McK-
eown launched a series of attacks on the medical system, arguing that improvements 
in health from the 18th century onward had been not the result of improved medi-
cal care, but rather the effects of more generally improved living conditions brought 
about by a more equitable distribution of wealth over time [24–26]. His contem-
porary Ivan Illich was even more scathing. Illich argued that disease and medicine 
ran at systemic tangents, with disease coming and going according to a logic that 
was utterly indifferent to medical intervention. Offering as one of his examples that, 
‘tuberculosis peaked over a 50–75 year period and declined before either the tuber-
cle bacillus had been discovered or anti-tuberculosis programs had been initiated,’ 
Illich concluded that ‘no connection between changes in disease patterns can be 
attributed to the professional practice of medicine’ [19, 20].
Other critics directed their attacks on the system in more immediate terms, 
picking apart moments in which medicine demanded a mode of thinking that was 
patently at odds with the care that the AMA had helped to popularise as an intrin-
sic part of medical practice. Perhaps the best-known and most eloquent voices here 
were those of the so-called ‘anti-psychiatrists,’ who noted the vast therapeutic gaps 
left between disease and experience of individuals diagnosed with a mental illness. 
The grand conceptual categories of disease, and the diagnostics and therapeutics 
they spawned, were unequivocally ill-equipped to deal with the immateriality and 
ephemeral workings of the human brain. The worry that Robertson had expressed in 
the early 19th century—that an iteration of medicine that relied on intellectual cat-
egories of disease would fail because illness was fundamentally a personal, material, 
individualised phenomenon—had for them been borne out [39].
Taken as a whole, these critiques articulated several of the larger and more wor-
rying conceptual points that plagued medicine. For one thing, there were diseases 
that medicine could not, and would never, effectively capture. Its inability to ‘see’ 
what was meaningful in mental illness, for instance, suggested one disturbing propo-
sition: that this iteration of medicine had been the wrong choice. Its articulation of 
disease entities in conceptual terms had given us a language and set of parameters 
for therapies, but the trade-off was that health could follow only one language, one 
logic, with diagnostics and therapeutics that adhered to one intellectual form. This 
recognition of the inadequacies of scientific medicine called out yet again the mis-
match between the materiality of patient illness and the conceptual fixes that medi-
cine could offer. And it brought up the thorny issue of how, if it was even possible, 
one might inject this system with the ‘caring’ required to meet contemporary needs.
It is out of these critiques that our current notions of care have arisen. The ten-
dency of the arguments to rhetorically connect medical effectiveness or ineffective-
ness in the main to a wide, uncaring and impersonal system created a new shorthand, 
such that ‘care’ became discursively essential to critiques of health care systems. 
Ironically, the AMA’s attempts to appropriate caring as the exclusive domain of 
doctors in the 1940 s came back to haunt them decades later when critics began to 
measure the medical system the group had sought to defend from nationalisation by 
that very yardstick.
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In the decades since then, dissatisfaction with medical systems has consistently 
been expressed in terms of this rhetoric of caring. We have continued to bemoan, 
as we have for the last decades, medicine’s failure to care. And yet, at the same 
time, as the vitriol of the mid-century critics quieted, we have also returned to a 
celebration of the results of our classifying, categorising, fundamentally uncaring, 
intellectually-oriented system of medicine. The result is an utter dissatisfaction with 
health care mixed with both a feeling of the inexorability of our current system and, 
more positively, an optimism associated with its successes nevertheless as an agent 
of health betterment.
Austerity
The discourse surrounding the impact of austerity on health repeats many of these 
themes, marking it not as a new and problematic interlocutor, but as the latest vehi-
cle for the same longstanding doubts about our health system. It has particular use 
as a moral agent, blamed for violating the core interests of health and health care in 
its inhumane denial of services to needy patients on a global level, and the replace-
ment of ‘care’ with efficiency protocols and cost-cutting measures at the local level 
[1, 32, 34, 36, 40]. Indeed, a 2017 special issue of Social Science & Medicine goes 
so far as to describe policies of austerity concerning health care as reflective of the 
moral failing of the ‘powerful:’ those decision-makers who ‘get to persistently frame 
our conversation’ in ways most beneficial to them [1]. In this and other visions of the 
impact of austerity on health care, the role of austerity is often described as a mech-
anism of obstruction, if not destruction—one that prevents the practice of medicine 
as it would otherwise be: optimal, caring, beneficent.
Austerity’s tacit invocation as a moral, rather than strictly economic, actor in the 
discussion surrounding health care has been well noted, even by economists. Florian 
Schui, for one, locates its point of origin in the concerns of the ancient Greeks about 
how to measure individual consumption in order to guard against the morally intol-
erable characteristics of decadence and hedonism that were associated with consum-
ing too much. This consideration about the right way to live, he claims, ineluctably 
made its way into the political and cultural spheres, elevating the moral goods of 
‘moderation, sacrifice [and] selflessness,’ from a concern of individuals keen to live 
well to a concern of culture and politics more generally [35].
Over the centuries, austerity has crossed over frequently from individual moral 
code to the cultural and political stage, even outside of explicit moments of auster-
ity. The various trajectories of the early twentieth century efficiency movement in 
Europe and the United States, for example, strongly and explicitly designated the 
practices of austerity on a personal level as integral to the increased productivity and 
economic health of the nation. And even as plans for the great post World War II 
welfare spending projects, like the National Health Service, were coming to fruition 
in Britain, Prime Minister Clement Attlee was looking to austerity, in the figure of 
Sir Stafford Cripps—‘austerity’s arch prophet’—to fix the economy [7]. Variously 
described as both a ‘selfless, gloomy scholar’ and the consummate ‘professional 
sourpuss,’ Cripps got the job, it is said, not because of his aptitude for economic 
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theory but for his personal commitment to asceticism. If Cripps could convince 
ordinary Britons to confine their metaphorical and literal diets to Spartan helpings 
of raw vegetables, as he himself did, Britain would make it out of the ‘economic 
wilderness’ of postwar debt [7].
But austerity is more than the principles of asceticism writ large. It is also struc-
turally configured as a kind of sociocultural ‘penance’ to the violation of the moral 
principles of appropriate consumption. In other words, it was the ‘virtuous pain after 
the immoral party’ of collective overconsumption, necessary to restore the moral 
status quo [35]. And it was indeed this penitential sense of austerity that was widely 
deployed after the 2008 financial collapse. As George Osborne, at the time chan-
cellor of the Exchequer, put it in 2010: ‘The truth is that the country has been liv-
ing beyond its means. Today, we must pay off the debts of a failed past and lay the 
foundations for a more prosperous future’ [4, 15, 30]. Whether or not austerity was 
the best policy for the country, his call for frugality and abstemiousness seemed to 
some an utterly natural, appropriate and even desirable solution that would restore 
the natural moral order.
In a general sense, it is probably already clear to many that it is the moral reso-
nance of austerity, rather than any more nuanced accounting of its economic impact, 
that has become so critical in discussions about health care. One need look no fur-
ther for evidence of this than the fact that though austerity has become one of our 
chief rhetorical tropes for expressing concerns about funding and health, the con-
cerns themselves are by no means new. As one set of commentators pithily noted, 
health care systems remain imperfect, and vulnerable populations remain vulner-
able, whether we are in a moment of austerity or not [1].
What is perhaps less obvious is that the discourse of austerity vis à vis health care 
is yet the latest expression of the same, ineffable, longstanding dissatisfaction with 
health care that has been our lot since the mid-twentieth century. Here, though, it 
is austerity that stands in for what health care perennially offers—utilitarian struc-
tures that systematically preclude caring—while the health care system that auster-
ity endangers ironically comes to embody the ‘caring’ system that we wish health 
care would optimally be. Austerity’s association with asceticism and penitence in 
particular shores up this image of caring medicine under attack, by those who would 
penalise the poorest for the overindulgences of the richest. However compelling this 
characterisation of austerity, it creates an image of health care that, by way of con-
trast, would dedicate itself at every level to caring—for individuals, groups, popula-
tions—if only it were left to its own devices. Much as we might like it to, the health 
care that austerity conjures up does not actually exist.
The dangers of describing health care systems as having been damaged or ruined 
by the imposition of political, economic, bureaucratic structures that constrain the 
caring part of health care are real. For one thing, they erroneously imply that aus-
terity, once removed, will leave us with an ideal system of care. For another, they 
mislead us into believing that the problems of health care are really just one, sin-
gular, problem: of funding. And yet, even a quick glimpse of historical discussions 
of health care funding are enough to dispel this claim. From the earliest days of the 
National Health Service (NHS), for example, concerns about how much to spend on 
health care in order to ensure ‘good health’ turned on the knotty problem of deciding 
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how to measure this ‘good health’ such that it could be appropriately monetized. As 
the NHS Royal Commission in 1979 pointed out, without an “objective or univer-
sally acceptable method of establishing what the ‘right’ level of expenditure on the 
NHS should be,” there is no way to assess how much spending is enough [16].
Exploring this ambivalence about how much funding is enough, the historical 
commentator Rudolf Klein has suggested that in fact it is our uncertainty about how 
much good health costs that has made it a habit for some to always presume that the 
NHS is underfunded [21]. Whether we agree with Klein or not, his suggestion here 
is useful. In describing the problem of monetizing health as a problem of defining 
good health, Klein perhaps unwittingly describes where the conflicted last half cen-
tury of health care has left us: without a clear vision of what it is that we want medi-
cine to do and without a clear vision of how it ought to change, in order the better to 
accommodate the care we claim to seek. Indeed, it was this same, deep ambivalence 
that catalysed the intellectual challenges of Robertson, Illich, McKeown and others. 
And it is this same ambivalence which has caused us to define health care, over the 
last decade in terms of austerity, primarily through a discourse of intense dissatisfac-
tion. We know health care, it would seem, chiefly in terms of what it is not.
To privilege austerity as we have damages our discussions by misleading us 
about the character and quality of health care more generally. Falling for a deceit 
perpetrated, if Schui and others are right, by austerity’s masquerade as an economic 
policy, we have been misled about the cause and character of medicine’s systemic 
problems. Rather than seeing the discourse surrounding austerity and medicine as 
one more rhetorical contrivance with which to reflect our conflicted sensibilities 
regarding medicine, we are encouraged to consider it instead as a moral failing of 
the state. In this way too, austerity has helped to extend the ruse that health care 
systems and the health they create are not culturally- and historically-contingent, but 
natural and moral entities.
The cultural theorist Mark Fisher made the pithy observation, in his 2009 Capi-
talist Realism, that one of the most telling indications of capitalism’s grip on us is 
our inability to imagine any alternatives. Capitalism has become so innate, so indis-
pensable to the fabric of our everyday lives, as to seem the only natural way to live: 
inexorable even when it is intolerable [9]. So it is with health care. Though we can 
clearly demonstrate that health care is a historically specific, constructed entity, 
with origins that definitely refute the view that our current system came into being 
because it was the best or most effective, we treat health care systems now as though 
they are inexorable—inexorable even when they are intolerable. Perhaps the most 
troubling element of the debates over austerity and health care is that they are blind, 
even obstructive, to alternatives. Instead, they reflect little more than the discursive 
inheritance of a longer history of expressing dissatisfaction with health care systems 
in the most oblique and least actionable of terms.
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